Whose Devil? Which Details?
Batterman has recently argued that fundamental theories are typically explanatorily inadequate, in that there exist physical phenomena whose explanation requires that the conceptual apparatus of a fundamental theory be supplemented by that of a less fundamental theory. This paper is an extended crit...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 72; no. 1; pp. 128 - 154 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=16850223&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 16850223 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2005 vid: 72 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 16850223 10.1086/428072 ppf: 128 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 228KB tig: atl: Whose Devil? Which Details? aug: au: Belot, Gordon affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA, 15260. su: Cybernetics Interpretation (Philosophy) Mathematics Philosophy Logic Physics sug: subj: Cybernetics Interpretation (Philosophy) Mathematics Philosophy Logic Physics ab: Batterman has recently argued that fundamental theories are typically explanatorily inadequate, in that there exist physical phenomena whose explanation requires that the conceptual apparatus of a fundamental theory be supplemented by that of a less fundamental theory. This paper is an extended critical commentary on that argument: situating its importance, describing its structure, and developing a line of objection to it. The objection is that in the examples Batterman considers, the mathematics of the less fundamental theory is definable in terms of the mathematics of the fundamental theory, and that only the latter need be given a physical interpretation-so we can view the desired explanation as drawing only upon resources internal to the more fundamental physical theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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