An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge.
This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on...
| Publicado en: | Episteme (Cambridge University Press) Vol. 20; no. 3; pp. 584 - 598 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=169785810&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 169785810 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 17423600 EHAO jtl: Episteme (Cambridge University Press) issn: 17423600 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 20 iid: 3 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 169785810 10.1017/epi.2022.30 ppf: 584 ppct: 14 formats: tig: atl: An Epistemological Disjunctivist Account of Memory Knowledge. aug: au: Kwok, Chung Him Ryan, Shane Mi, Chienkuo affil: Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Singapore Management University, Singapore Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan su: Knowledge acquisition (Expert systems) Memory Explicit memory sug: subj: Knowledge acquisition (Expert systems) Memory Explicit memory keyword: declarative memory Epistemological disjunctivism memory knowledge perceptual knowledge ab: This paper explores the prospects for a Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. We begin by providing an overview of Duncan Pritchard's epistemological disjunctivist account of perceptual knowledge, as well as the theoretical advantages of such an account. Drawing on that account, we present and motivate our own Pritchardean epistemological disjunctivist account of memory knowledge. After distinguishing different sorts of memory and the different roles that memory can play in knowledge acquisition, we set out our account and argue that the case for epistemological disjunctivism enjoys parity with the case for epistemological disjunctivism of perceptual knowledge. We also consider objections to our account. The first is from Joe Milburn and Andrew Moon, who argue against a general epistemological disjunctivism of memory on the basis of differences in memory types. The second objection arises from a Radford-like case whereby one's true belief is from memory even though one lacks rational support that is reflectively accessible to one. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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