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Emergent mental properties are not just double-preventers.

We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 202; no. 2; pp. 1 - 23
Main Authors: Buckareff, Andrei A., Hawkins, Jessica
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Aug2023
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Emergent mental properties are not just double-preventers.
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          Buckareff, Andrei A.
          Hawkins, Jessica
        affil: Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Marist College, 12601, Poughkeepsie, NY, USA
      sug:
      keyword:
        Causation
        Dualism
        Emergentism
        Mental causation
        Metaphysics
        Mind
        Powers
        Properties
      ab: We examine Sophie Gibb’s emergent property-dualist theory of mental causation as double-prevention. Her account builds on a commitment to a version of causal realism based on a powers metaphysic. We consider three objections to her account. We show, by drawing out the implications of the ontological commitments of Gibb’s theory of mental causation, that the first two objections fail. But, we argue, owing to worries about cases where there is no double-preventive role to be played by mental properties, her account, which solely affords mental properties a double-preventive role, is incomplete and vulnerable to a causal exclusion objection. We propose a friendly modification to her theory of mental causation that is consistent with her theory’s ontological commitments. Specifically, we sketch an account on which mental properties have a more pronounced causal-structuring role that is not exhausted by the role Gibb assigns them as double-preventers. The result is a novel emergentist theory of mental causation.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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