A new challenge for contingentists.
Contingentism is the view that it is contingent which things exist. Despite its plausibility, advocates of contingentism face a well-known 'challenge' to demonstrate that they can draw what appear to be intelligible modal distinctions (Williamson Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press,...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 8; pp. 2457 - 2485 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=169870919&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 169870919 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2023 vid: 180 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 169870919 10.1007/s11098-023-01942-6 ppf: 2457 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: A new challenge for contingentists. aug: au: Roberts, Alexander affil: Oriel College, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK su: Plausibility (Logic) Modal logic First-order logic Necessity (Philosophy) Modern logic sug: subj: Plausibility (Logic) Modal logic First-order logic Necessity (Philosophy) Modern logic keyword: Contingentism Modality Necessitism Second-order logic ab: Contingentism is the view that it is contingent which things exist. Despite its plausibility, advocates of contingentism face a well-known 'challenge' to demonstrate that they can draw what appear to be intelligible modal distinctions (Williamson Modal Logic as Metaphysics. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013). In this article, I argue that if certain controversial modal principles fail, the challenge contingentists face becomes much more difficult. Whereas extant challenges concern contingentists' inability to draw quite theoretical second-order modal distinctions, I present a challenge which concerns contingentists' inability to draw simpler first-order distinctions. This indicates that in certain modal settings there may well be significant first-order barriers to maintaining contingentism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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