Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy: The True Belief Machine.
Here I will re-purpose Nozick's (1974) "Experience Machine" thought experiment against hedonism into an argument against Veritic Epistemic Consequentialism. According to VEC, the right action, epistemically speaking, is the one that results in at least as favorable a ratio of true to false belief as...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 8; pp. 2415 - 2434 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=169870927&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 169870927 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2023 vid: 180 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 169870927 10.1007/s11098-023-01987-7 ppf: 2415 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 779KB tig: atl: Epistemic Normativity & Epistemic Autonomy: The True Belief Machine. aug: au: Paulson, Spencer affil: Northwestern University, Kresge 3512, 1880 Campus Drive, 60208, Evanston, IL, USA su: Normativity (Ethics) Epistemics Hedonism Belief & doubt Consequentialism (Ethics) sug: subj: Normativity (Ethics) Epistemics Hedonism Belief & doubt Consequentialism (Ethics) keyword: Epistemic Consequentialism Epistemic Normativity Experience Machine Intellectual Autonomy Veritism ab: Here I will re-purpose Nozick's (1974) "Experience Machine" thought experiment against hedonism into an argument against Veritic Epistemic Consequentialism. According to VEC, the right action, epistemically speaking, is the one that results in at least as favorable a ratio of true to false belief as any other action available. A consequence of VEC is that it would be epistemically right to outsource all your cognitive endeavors to a matrix-like "True Belief Machine" that uploads true beliefs through artificial stimulation. Rather than reflecting, inferring or inquiring, all of your beliefs would be the product of updates coming from the machine. This implication of VEC is counter intuitive. I will spend much of the paper considering defensive maneuvers and showing them to be lacking. The problem with going in for the True Belief Machine seems to be that the subject forfeits her autonomy. There has been much work lately on the virtue of intellectual autonomy and some of it has the potential to explain what is epistemically amiss about plugging into the machine. However, I will argue that the proponent of VEC cannot appeal to it without abandoning her preferred order of explanation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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