Supposition and (Statistical) Models.

In a recent paper, Sprenger advances what he calls a "suppositional" answer to the question of why a Bayesian agent's degrees of belief should align with the probabilities found in statistical models. I show that Sprenger's account trades on an ambiguity between hypothetical and subjunctive supposit...

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 3; pp. 744 - 750
Autor principal: Dethier, Corey
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Jul2023
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Supposition and (Statistical) Models.
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        Statistical models
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          Statistical models
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      ab: In a recent paper, Sprenger advances what he calls a "suppositional" answer to the question of why a Bayesian agent's degrees of belief should align with the probabilities found in statistical models. I show that Sprenger's account trades on an ambiguity between hypothetical and subjunctive suppositions and cannot succeed once we distinguish between the two.
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