Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed?
Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motiv...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 57; no. 3; pp. 618 - 641 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=170042584&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 170042584 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 57 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 170042584 10.1111/nous.12424 ppf: 618 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 270KB tig: atl: Is there an epistemic advantage to being oppressed? aug: au: Dror, Lidal affil: Princeton University su: Motivation (Psychology) Oppression sug: subj: Motivation (Psychology) Oppression ab: Do the oppressed have an epistemic advantage when it comes to knowing about the systems that oppress them? If so, what explains this advantage? In this paper, I consider whether an epistemic advantage can be derived from the oppressed's contingent tendency to have more relevant experiences and motivation than the non‐oppressed; or, alternatively, whether an advantage derives from the oppressed's very lived experience, thus being in principle unavailable to the non‐oppressed. I then explore the potential role of knowledge‐how for explaining an epistemic advantage. Ultimately, I conclude that the oppressed tend to have a contingent advantage, while rejecting that they have one in principle, except for when their phenomenological experience has an effect on the veracity of the claims they make. This has the important upshot that privileged people are not epistemically disadvantaged in principle and are thus often blameworthy for their ignorance about oppression. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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