A Lewisian Argument Against Platonism, or Why Theses About Abstract Objects Are Unintelligible.
In this paper, I argue that all expressions for abstract objects are meaningless. My argument closely follows David Lewis' argument against the intelligibility of certain theories of possible worlds, but modifies it in order to yield a general conclusion about language pertaining to abstract objects...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 7; pp. 3037 - 3058 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Oct2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=170062832&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 170062832 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2023 vid: 88 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 170062832 10.1007/s10670-021-00489-4 ppf: 3037 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 674KB tig: atl: A Lewisian Argument Against Platonism, or Why Theses About Abstract Objects Are Unintelligible. aug: au: Himelright, Jack affil: Department of Philosophy, Tel Aviv University, Gilman 363, Ramat Aviv, 6997801, Tel Aviv, Israel Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, 100 Malloy Hall, 46556-4619, Notre Dame, IN, USA su: Platonists Argument Nominalism Intelligibility of speech Motivation (Psychology) sug: subj: Platonists Argument Nominalism Intelligibility of speech Motivation (Psychology) ab: In this paper, I argue that all expressions for abstract objects are meaningless. My argument closely follows David Lewis' argument against the intelligibility of certain theories of possible worlds, but modifies it in order to yield a general conclusion about language pertaining to abstract objects. If my Lewisian argument is sound, not only can we not know that abstract objects exist, we cannot even refer to or think about them. However, while the Lewisian argument strongly motivates nominalism, it also undermines certain nominalist theories. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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