Expanding the political market framework to explain executive decision‐making during the COVID‐19 crisis.
The traditional political market framework (PMF) argues that elected officials respond to policy demands by adopting policy that furthers their goal of reelection. However, an emerging crisis can make this approach to decision‐making challenging as the immediacy of response, the needs of the public,...
| Publicado en: | Public Administration Review Vol. 83; no. 5; pp. 1281 - 1300 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=171105078&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 171105078 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00333352 PBA jtl: Public Administration Review issn: 00333352 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 83 iid: 5 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 171105078 10.1111/puar.13613 ppf: 1281 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 992KB tig: atl: Expanding the political market framework to explain executive decision‐making during the COVID‐19 crisis. aug: au: Curley, Cali Federman, Peter Stanley Shen, Ruowen affil: Department of Political Science, University of Miami, Coral Gables Florida,, USA Paul H. O'Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs, Indiana University – Purdue University Indianapolis, Indianapolis Indiana,, USA Hugo Wall School of Public Affairs, Wichita State University, Wichita Kansas,, USA su: Bureaucracy COVID-19 pandemic Public officers Decision making Political succession Executives sug: subj: Bureaucracy COVID-19 pandemic Public officers Decision making Political succession Executives ab: The traditional political market framework (PMF) argues that elected officials respond to policy demands by adopting policy that furthers their goal of reelection. However, an emerging crisis can make this approach to decision‐making challenging as the immediacy of response, the needs of the public, and technical expertise may conflict with reelection goals. This conflict can encourage elected officials to engage in blame avoidance by delegating policy‐making powers to the bureaucracy. Utilizing a mixed methods approach to analyze state‐level governor responses to COVID‐19, this paper expands the PMF by capturing the influence of bureaucratic demands on elected official decisions to delegate or transfer power to the bureaucracy. We find evidence that bureaucratic expertise, under the right set of circumstances, influences policymaker decisions to delegate policymaking power. Lastly, we advocate for a renewed focus on democratic principles and the consequences of delegation for transparency, accountability, and social equity. In understanding the specific dynamics at play when bureaucrats and executives work to develop policy in crisis, practitioners may gain a better understanding of how to navigate difficult decisions. The specific executive orders across states are not particularly well‐known, and providing evidence of the steps other states took to combat the crisis may prove useful to practitioners in the emergency management space. If practitioners have a more complete understanding of why policy is made and by what mechanisms, they may apply a focus on implementation strategies that are effective and relevant. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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