When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States.
We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population,...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 61; no. 4; pp. 851 - 870 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2023
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=171312690&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 171312690 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2023 vid: 61 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 171312690 10.1111/ecin.13158 ppf: 851 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 799KB tig: atl: When social assistance meets market power: A mixed duopoly view of health insurance in the United States. aug: au: Ranasinghe, Ashantha Su, Xuejuan affil: Department of Economics, University of Alberta, Edmonton Alberta, , Canada su: United States Health insurance Medicaid Market power Going public (Securities) Product quality Health insurance exchanges sug: subj: Health insurance Medicaid United States Direct individual life, health and medical insurance carriers Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers Administration of Human Resource Programs (except Education, Public Health, and Veterans' Affairs Programs) Market power Going public (Securities) Product quality Health insurance exchanges keyword: distributional effects mixed duopoly public provision of private goods quality differentiation distributional effects mixed duopoly public provision of private goods quality differentiation ab: We develop a mixed duopoly model with quality‐differentiated products. The public firm offers its product for free to eligible individuals, while the private firm chooses its product quality and price to maximize profit. We calibrate the model to health insurance for the U.S. working‐age population, with Medicaid being the public firm. We examine distributional implications of policies that expand Medicaid to various degrees. Despite potentially significant inefficiency of Medicaid, its expansion is welfare improving. Central to these findings is the significant market power of the private firm when left unchecked, which is increasingly disciplined as more individuals become Medicaid eligible. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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