Confusion in the Bishop's Church.
Kearns (2021) reconstructs Berkeley's (1713) Master Argument as a formally valid argument against the Materialist Thesis, with the key premise the Distinct Conceivability Thesis, namely the thesis that truths about sensible objects having or lacking thinkable qualities are (distinctly) conceivable a...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 51; no. 4; pp. 1993 - 2004 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=171949968&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 171949968 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 51 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 171949968 10.1007/s11406-023-00634-z ppf: 1993 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 287KB tig: atl: Confusion in the Bishop's Church. aug: au: Heylen, Jan affil: Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Andreas Vesaliusstraat 2, 3000, Leuven, Belgium su: Berkeley, George, 1685-1753 Idealism Argument Kearns, Stephen Thesis statements (Rhetoric) Animism sug: subj: Berkeley, George, 1685-1753 Idealism Argument Kearns, Stephen Thesis statements (Rhetoric) Animism keyword: de dicto conceivability de re conceivability Distinct Conceivability Thesis George Berkeley Master Argument ab: Kearns (2021) reconstructs Berkeley's (1713) Master Argument as a formally valid argument against the Materialist Thesis, with the key premise the Distinct Conceivability Thesis, namely the thesis that truths about sensible objects having or lacking thinkable qualities are (distinctly) conceivable and as its conclusion that all sensible objects are conceived. It will be shown that Distinct Conceivability Thesis entails the Reduction Thesis, which states that de dicto propositional (ordinary or distinct) conceivability reduces to de re propositional (ordinary or distinct) conceivability. While Kearns (2021) set out to avoid the confusion of a de re claim with a de dicto claim, which Prior (1955) accused Berkeley of, Kearns can be accused of making a similar conceptual confusion. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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