Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects.
One emerging issue in contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between animal knowledge, which can be had by agents unable to take a view on the epistemic status of their attitudes, and reflective knowledge, which is only available to agents capable of taking such a view. Philosophers who are...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 51; no. 4; pp. 2065 - 2084 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=171949983&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 171949983 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 51 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 171949983 10.1007/s11406-023-00658-5 ppf: 2065 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 699KB tig: atl: Normative Defeaters and the Alleged Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects. aug: au: Melis, Giacomo affil: University of Stirling, Stirling, United Kingdom su: Theory of knowledge Dualism Apologetics (Rhetoric) Goldberg, Sanford Matheson, Jonathan sug: subj: Theory of knowledge Dualism Apologetics (Rhetoric) Goldberg, Sanford Matheson, Jonathan keyword: Animal and reflective knowledge Diachronic epistemology Epistemic defeaters Jonathan Matheson Propositional and doxastic justification Sanford Goldberg ab: One emerging issue in contemporary epistemology concerns the relation between animal knowledge, which can be had by agents unable to take a view on the epistemic status of their attitudes, and reflective knowledge, which is only available to agents capable of taking such a view. Philosophers who are open to animal knowledge often presume that while many of the beliefs of human adults are formed unreflectively and thus constitute mere animal knowledge, some of them—those which become subject of explicit scrutiny or are the result of a deliberative effort—may attain the status of reflective knowledge. According to Sanford Goldberg and Jonathan Matheson (2020), however, it is impossible for reflective subjects to have mere animal knowledge. If correct, their view would have a number of repercussions, perhaps most notably the vindication of a dualism about knowledge, which would frustrate attempts to provide a unified account of knowledge-attributions to human adults, very young children, and non-human animals. I discuss Goldberg and Matheson's proposal, outline some of the ways in which it is insightful, and argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful because it neglects the inherent temporal dimension of knowledge acquisition. While the article is pitched as a reply to Goldberg and Matheson, its primary aim is to highlight significant connections between the debates on the relation between animal and reflective knowledge, propositional and doxastic justification, and the theory of epistemic defeat. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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