A Duty not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame.
A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in rec...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 73; no. 4; pp. 933 - 950 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Oct2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=172332067&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 172332067 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2023 vid: 73 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 172332067 10.1093/pq/pqad073 ppf: 933 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 377KB tig: atl: A Duty not to Remain Silent: Hypocrisy and the Lack of Standing not to Blame. aug: au: Lippert-Rasmussen, Kasper affil: Aarhus University, Denmark, and UiT-The Arctice University of Norway , Norway su: Blame Hypocrisy Justification (Ethics) Silence (Philosophy) Ethics sug: subj: Blame Hypocrisy Justification (Ethics) Silence (Philosophy) Ethics keyword: Ethics of blame hypocrisy omitting to blame standing to blame ab: A notable feature of our practice of blaming is that blamees can dismiss blame for their own blameworthy actions when the blamer is censuring them hypocritically and, as it is often put, lacks standing to blame them as a result. This feature has received a good deal of philosophical attention in recent years. By contrast, no attention has been given the possibility that, likewise, refraining from blaming can be hypocritical and dismissed as standingless. I argue that hypocritical refrainers have a duty to blame, if asked to do so, and possibly even if they are not asked to do so. Acknowledging this fact about hypocritical silence is crucial to an adequate understanding of our practice of blaming. Specifically, it bears on a worry that naturally arises when we consider cases where the blamee is blameworthy yet the blaming is problematic, because standingless. The worry is that, absurdly, the idea of standing justifies our being more interested in silencing preachers of virtue than making wrongdoers overcome vice. However, if one can lack standing not to blame, this concern is unwarranted. If there is such a thing as standing to blame, then sometimes one must, for reasons of standing, speak up in the face of wrongdoing, meaning, in effect, that one lacks the right not to challenge wrongdoers to improve. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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