Against the Humean Argument for Extended Simples.
Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fund...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 101; no. 3; pp. 551 - 564 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=172840090&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 172840090 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 101 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 172840090 10.1080/00048402.2022.2036783 ppf: 551 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: Against the Humean Argument for Extended Simples. aug: au: Lo, Tien-Chun Lin, Hsuan-Chih affil: Oriel College, University of Oxford Soochow University, Taiwan su: Spacetime Pluralism Whole & parts (Philosophy) Metaphysics Disjunction (Logic) sug: subj: Spacetime Pluralism Whole & parts (Philosophy) Metaphysics Disjunction (Logic) keyword: accidental properties extended simples location mereology the Humean principle ab: Is it possible that there are extended simples—material objects extended in space or spacetime that have no proper parts? The most commonly cited argument for this possibility is based on a version of the Humean principle: namely (and with some qualifications), any pattern of instantiation of a fundamental relation is possible. In this paper, we make the Humean argument fully explicit, and criticise it from three aspects—the Disjunction problem, the Pluralist problem, and the Accidentality problem. First, the original argument only shows a disjunctive thesis: either extended simples are possible, or unextended complexes are possible. In order to reach the desired conclusion, some additional premise is needed. Yet, even though we agree that the Disjunction problem can be met, we argue that the Humean argument fails to establish the possibility of extended simples, for two reasons: the first comes from compositional pluralism, and the second is about the definition of accidental properties. We contend that the latter two problems put the proponents of the Humean argument in serious difficulty. Thus, metaphysicians who hold that there are extended simples should find better arguments for this view. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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