The reactive theory of emotions.
Evaluative theories of emotions purport to shed light on the nature of emotions by appealing to values. Three kinds of evaluative theories of emotions dominate the recent literature: the judgment theory equates emotions with value judgments; the perceptual theory equates emotions with perceptions of...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 31; no. 3; pp. 785 - 803 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Evaluative theories of emotions purport to shed light on the nature of emotions by appealing to values. Three kinds of evaluative theories of emotions dominate the recent literature: the judgment theory equates emotions with value judgments; the perceptual theory equates emotions with perceptions of values, and the attitudinal theory equates emotions with evaluative attitudes. This paper defends a fourth kind of evaluative theory of emotions, mostly neglected so far: the reactive theory. Reactive theories claim that emotions are attitudes which arise in reaction to perceptions of value. |
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