| Sumario: | This kind of task analysis is similar to Husserl's functional phenomenology, Pokropski claims, because Husserl himself engages in what Pokropski calls "phenomenological decomposition" (150-152). Marek Pokropski's I Mechanisms and Consciousness i is a recent contribution to the literature at the intersection of cognitive science and Husserlian phenomenology. That is, even though much of Husserl's efforts involved the philosophically more ambitious transcendental phenomenology, Husserl did see a place for phenomenology to be applied in the less philosophically ambitious domain of empirical psychology. The most important primary source for Pokropksi's interpretation here is §86 of I Ideen I i (Husserl [5]), in which Husserl introduced the notion of "functional phenomenology" and there claimed that "the greatest problems of all are the I functional problems i " (146).
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