Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking.
If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the unive...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 107; no. 2; pp. 439 - 470 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=172959650&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 172959650 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2023 vid: 107 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 172959650 10.1111/phpr.12925 ppf: 439 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Causal counterfactuals without miracles or backtracking. aug: au: Gallow, J. Dmitri affil: Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, ACU su: Counterfactuals (Logic) Physical laws Jurisprudence Semantics Decision theory sug: subj: Counterfactuals (Logic) Physical laws Jurisprudence Semantics Decision theory ab: If the laws are deterministic, then standard theories of counterfactuals are forced to reject at least one of the following conditionals: 1) had you chosen differently, there would not have been a violation of the laws of nature; and 2) had you chosen differently, the initial conditions of the universe would not have been different. On the relevant readings—where we hold fixed factors causally independent of your choice—both of these conditionals appear true. And rejecting either one leads to trouble for philosophical theories which rely upon counterfactual conditionals—like, for instance, causal decision theory. Here, I outline a semantics for counterfactual conditionals which allows us to accept both (1) and (2). And I discuss how this semantics deals with objections to causal decision theory from Arif Ahmed. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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