By(e) enduring? An answer to Wasserman.
According to a recent argument due to Wasserman, endurantism does not qualify as an explanatory theory of persistence inasmuch as it either provides a circular account of persistence facts or merely rejects the perdurantist’s explanation of such facts. This paper challenges Wasserman’s conclusions b...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 202; no. 4; pp. 1 - 13 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=172999766&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 172999766 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2023 vid: 202 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 172999766 10.1007/s11229-023-04351-8 ppf: 1 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 319KB tig: atl: By(e) enduring? An answer to Wasserman. aug: au: Scarpati, Maria Calosi, Claudio affil: https://ror.org/00vasag41 University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland https://ror.org/052gg0110 University of Oxford, Oxford, UK https://ror.org/01swzsf04 Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland sug: keyword: Being wholly present Endurantism Explanation Location Persistence Temporal parts ab: According to a recent argument due to Wasserman, endurantism does not qualify as an explanatory theory of persistence inasmuch as it either provides a circular account of persistence facts or merely rejects the perdurantist’s explanation of such facts. This paper challenges Wasserman’s conclusions by pointing out that an endurantist answer to his complaint is available thanks to the locational notions of persistence provided in the work of Gilmore, Parsons, Balashov among others. It then gives details as to how such notions can be used to answer Wasserman’s specific argument for the idea that endurantism is either unexplanatory or circular. After a brief introduction (Sect. 1) we provide the technical notions that we need to answer Wasserman’s complaint (Sect. 2) and offer a phrasing of endurantism which is immune to that complaint in terms of locative notions (Sect. 3). We then prove that two further conceptions of endurantism are entailed by that phrasing. Crucially, such conceptions are phrased in terms that Wasserman himself cannot, on pain of inconsistency, dismiss, as those are the very terms in which he conceives of endurantism in the first place—that is, whole presence and the rejection of temporal parts (Sect. 4). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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