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Crossing Levels: Meta-induction and the Problem of Induction.

Gerhard Schurz claims to have a solution to Hume's problem of induction based on results from machine learning concerning meta-induction. His argument has two steps. The first is to establish a justification for following a certain meta-inductive strategy based on its predictive optimality. The seco...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 4; pp. 985 - 994
Main Author: Henderson, Leah
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Oct2023
Subjects:
Machine learning
Induced ovulation
Argument
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Crossing Levels: Meta-induction and the Problem of Induction.
      aug:
        au: Henderson, Leah
        affil: Department of Theoretical Philosophy, University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712GL Groningen, The Netherlands
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        Machine learning
        Induced ovulation
        Argument
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          Machine learning
          Induced ovulation
          Argument
      ab: Gerhard Schurz claims to have a solution to Hume's problem of induction based on results from machine learning concerning meta-induction. His argument has two steps. The first is to establish a justification for following a certain meta-inductive strategy based on its predictive optimality. The second step is to show how this justification can be transferred to object-induction. I unpack the second step and fail to find a convincing argument supporting the transfer of justification from meta-induction to object-induction. My conclusion is that the problem of induction has not yet been solved by appeal to meta-induction.
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    language: English
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