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First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models.

According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 202; no. 5; pp. 1 - 21
Main Authors: Pokropski, Marek, Suffczynski, Piotr
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Nov2023
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: First-person constraints on dynamic-mechanistic explanations in neuroscience: The case of migraine and epilepsy models.
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        au:
          Pokropski, Marek
          Suffczynski, Piotr
        affil:
          https://ror.org/039bjqg32 Faculty of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
          https://ror.org/039bjqg32 Faculty of Physics, University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland
      sug:
      keyword:
        Dynamic explanation
        Epilepsy
        Explanatory constraints
        First-person experience
        Mechanistic explanation
        Migraine
      ab: According to recent discussion, cross-explanatory integration in cognitive science might proceed by constraints on mechanistic and dynamic-mechanistic models provided by different research fields. However, not much attention has been given to constraints that could be provided by the study of first-person experience, which in the case of multifaceted mental phenomena are of key importance. In this paper, we fill this gap and consider the question whether information about first-person experience can constrain dynamic-mechanistic models and what the character of this relation is. We discuss two cases of such explanatory models in neuroscience, namely that of migraine and of epilepsy. We argue that, in these cases, first-person insights about the target phenomena significantly contributed to explanatory models by shaping explanatory hypotheses and by indicating the dynamical properties that the explanatory models of these phenomena should account for, and thus directly constraining the space of possible explanations.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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