Perceptual noise and the bell curve objection.
Perceptual experience supports the assignment of confidences in belief – doxastic confidences. To explain this fact, many philosophers appeal to Perceptual Indeterminacy, which holds that perceptual content can be more or less determinate. Others instead appeal to Perceptual Confidence, which says t...
| Publicado en: | Analysis Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 429 - 437 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=173782043&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 173782043 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00032638 7OX jtl: Analysis issn: 00032638 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 83 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 173782043 10.1093/analys/anad007 ppf: 429 ppct: 8 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 94KB tig: atl: Perceptual noise and the bell curve objection. aug: au: Beck, Jacob Languedoc, William affil: Department of Philosophy & Centre for Vision Research, York University , Canada su: Indeterminism (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Philosophy of mind Confidence sug: subj: Indeterminism (Philosophy) Perception (Philosophy) Theory of knowledge Philosophy of mind Confidence ab: Perceptual experience supports the assignment of confidences in belief – doxastic confidences. To explain this fact, many philosophers appeal to Perceptual Indeterminacy, which holds that perceptual content can be more or less determinate. Others instead appeal to Perceptual Confidence, which says that perceptual experience supports doxastic confidences because it assigns confidences too. Morrison argues that a primary reason to favour Perceptual Confidence is that it is uniquely capable of accounting for bell-shaped doxastic confidence distributions; we call this the bell curve objection to Perceptual Indeterminacy. Here we show that two recent defences of Perceptual Indeterminacy, due to Nanay and Raleigh and Vindrola, fail to adequately address the bell curve objection. But we also argue that all is not lost for proponents of Perceptual Indeterminacy. They can counter the bell curve objection by embracing a third view, which we call Perceptual Noise. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 The Analysis Trust. item: Analysis holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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