The topology of persons, and surviving to some degree.
Braddon-Mitchell and Miller put forward the claim that the relation of being-the-same-person is gradable: a person can be the same person tomorrow as today, but only half the same. To justify their thesis, they propose a model of persons that is intended to be metaphysically neutral. This article se...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 202; no. 6; pp. 1 - 38 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=173874560&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 173874560 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 202 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 173874560 10.1007/s11229-023-04406-w ppf: 1 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 701KB tig: atl: The topology of persons, and surviving to some degree. aug: au: Skowron, Bartłomiej Kąkol, Tomasz Król, Zbigniew affil: https://ror.org/00y0xnp53 Faculty of Administration and Social Sciences, Warsaw University of Technology, Pl. Politechniki 1, 00-661, Warsaw, Poland https://ror.org/011dv8m48 Institut of Philosophy, University of Gdańsk, Jana Bażyńskiego 4, 80-309, Gdańsk, Poland sug: keyword: Being-the-same-person relation Ontology of person Topological explanations Topology of person ab: Braddon-Mitchell and Miller put forward the claim that the relation of being-the-same-person is gradable: a person can be the same person tomorrow as today, but only half the same. To justify their thesis, they propose a model of persons that is intended to be metaphysically neutral. This article sets out to show that such a model implicitly contains strong metaphysical assumptions that run contrary to the authors’ own statements. Using Roman Ingarden’s phenomenological ontology, we aim to demonstrate that within the model in question persons exist intentionally, where this leads to a caricature rather than an adequate account of persons. In opposition to Braddon-Mitchell and Miller, we argue that the justification presented for the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person in fact makes it reasonable to demand that an adequate model of persons be posited. We present Kurt Lewin’s holistic topological-dynamic model, and show that in this context it is not being-the-same-person that is gradable, but rather the characteristic (of persons) that is dimension. Thus, we reject the thesis of the gradability of the relation of being-the-same-person involved in personal identity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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