Capturing the conspiracist's imagination.
Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we'd believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren'...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 12; pp. 3353 - 3382 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=173923532&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 173923532 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 180 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 173923532 10.1007/s11098-023-02038-x ppf: 3353 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 677KB tig: atl: Capturing the conspiracist's imagination. aug: au: Munro, Daniel affil: https://ror.org/05fq50484 Department of Philosophy, York University, S448 Ross Building, 4700 Keele Street, M3J 1P3, Toronto, ON, Canada su: Imagination Belief & doubt Empirical research Narratives Conspiracy theories sug: subj: Imagination Belief & doubt Empirical research Narratives Conspiracy theories keyword: Evidence Religious belief ab: Some incredibly far-fetched conspiracy theories circulate online these days. For most of us, clear evidence would be required before we'd believe these extraordinary theories. Yet, conspiracists often cite evidence that seems transparently very weak. This is puzzling, since conspiracists often aren't irrational people who are incapable of rationally processing evidence. I argue that existing accounts of conspiracist belief formation don't fully address this puzzle. Then, drawing on both philosophical and empirical considerations, I propose a new explanation that appeals to the role of the imagination in conspiracist belief formation. I argue that conspiracists first become imaginatively absorbed in conspiracist narratives, where this helps to explain how they process their evidence. From there, we can better understand why they find this evidence so compelling, as well as the psychological role it plays in their belief forming processes. This account also has practical implications for combatting the spread of online conspiracy theories. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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