Limitative computational explanations.
What is computational explanation? Many accounts treat it as a kind of causal explanation. I argue against two more specific versions of this view, corresponding to two popular treatments of causal explanation. The first holds that computational explanation is mechanistic, while the second holds tha...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 12; pp. 3441 - 3462 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=173923533&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 173923533 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 180 iid: 12 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 173923533 10.1007/s11098-023-02039-w ppf: 3441 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 689KB tig: atl: Limitative computational explanations. aug: au: Curtis-Trudel, André affil: https://ror.org/0563pg902 Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong SAR, China su: Explanation Plausibility (Logic) Computer science Theory of knowledge Problem solving sug: subj: Explanation Plausibility (Logic) Computer science Theory of knowledge Problem solving keyword: Implementation Mathematical explanation Physical computation ab: What is computational explanation? Many accounts treat it as a kind of causal explanation. I argue against two more specific versions of this view, corresponding to two popular treatments of causal explanation. The first holds that computational explanation is mechanistic, while the second holds that it is interventionist. However, both overlook an important class of computational explanations, which I call limitative explanations. Limitative explanations explain why certain problems cannot be solved computationally, either in principle or in practice. I argue that limitative explanations are not plausibly understood in either mechanistic or interventionist terms. One upshot of this argument is that there are causal and non-causal kinds of computational explanation. I close the paper by suggesting that both are grounded in the notion of computational implementation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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