Conventionalism about mathematics and logic.
Conventionalism about mathematics has much in common with two other views: fictionalism and the multiverse view (aka plenitudinous platonism). The three views may differ over the existence of mathematical objects, but they agree in rejecting a certain kind of objectivity claim about mathematics, adv...
| Publicado en: | Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 57; no. 4; pp. 815 - 832 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174031943&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 174031943 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00294624 D97 jtl: Nous (0029-4624) issn: 00294624 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 57 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 174031943 10.1111/nous.12428 ppf: 815 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 188KB tig: atl: Conventionalism about mathematics and logic. aug: au: Field, Hartry affil: New York University su: Philosophy of mathematics Fictionalism (Philosophy) Objectivism (Philosophy) Paradox Platonists Pluralism Logic sug: subj: Philosophy of mathematics Fictionalism (Philosophy) Objectivism (Philosophy) Paradox Platonists Pluralism Logic ab: Conventionalism about mathematics has much in common with two other views: fictionalism and the multiverse view (aka plenitudinous platonism). The three views may differ over the existence of mathematical objects, but they agree in rejecting a certain kind of objectivity claim about mathematics, advocating instead an extreme pluralism. The early parts of the paper will try to elucidate this anti‐objectivist position, and question whether conventionalism really offers a third form of it distinct from fictionalism and the multiverse view. The paper then turns to anti‐objectivism about logic, and suggests that here too conventionalism offers no distinct alternative, and that there are limits on the extent of pluralism/anti‐objectivism. It also argues that these limits can't be used to argue for more extensive objectivity within mathematics, and also that they do allow for more limited pluralism within logic, e.g. as regards resolution of semantic and property‐theoretic paradoxes. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Nous (0029-4624) is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Nous (0029-4624) holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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