Leaving the Dream Behind: Why the Metaphysics of Consciousness cannot be Unveiled by Conceivability Arguments.
The article "Leaving the Dream Behind: Why the Metaphysics of Consciousness cannot be Unveiled by Conceivability Arguments" by Luis Alejandro Murillo-Lara challenges Chalmers's master argument against the privileged strategy of 'type B' physicalists. The author argues that zombies cannot share our e...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 104; pp. 119 - 132 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174046302&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 174046302 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2023 vid: 104 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 174046302 10.15388/Problemos.2023.104.9 ppf: 119 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.5MB tig: atl: Leaving the Dream Behind: Why the Metaphysics of Consciousness cannot be Unveiled by Conceivability Arguments. aug: au: Alejandro Murillo-Lara, Luis affil: Augustinian University, Universidad Nacional de Colombia su: Consciousness Metaphysics Argument sug: subj: Consciousness Metaphysics Argument keyword: conceivability master argument phenomenal concepts strategy possibility fenomenalių sąvokų argumentas galimybė kertinis argumentas suvokiamumas ab: The article "Leaving the Dream Behind: Why the Metaphysics of Consciousness cannot be Unveiled by Conceivability Arguments" by Luis Alejandro Murillo-Lara challenges Chalmers's master argument against the privileged strategy of 'type B' physicalists. The author argues that zombies cannot share our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness due to a kind of mental state they lack. The paper critiques Chalmers's conceivability argument, highlighting challenges with primary, ideal, and positive conceivability. The author concludes that the phenomenal concept strategy provides a sound explanation for why the conceivability of zombies likely does not imply their metaphysical possibility. In this paper, I present a novel objection to Chalmers's "master argument" against the privileged strategy of 'type B' physicalists to account for the explanatory gap (the "phenomenal concepts strategy"). Specifically, I argue that the second horn of the master argument gets wrong why zombies cannot have our epistemic situation with regard to consciousness. Zombies cannot have a kind of mental state that we have. If something must have all of our psychological attributes to share our epistemic situation, then zombies cannot serve the purpose of the second horn of the dilemma. By way of background, I begin by briefly outlining a related argument against physicalism, also advanced by D. Chalmers - the "conceivability argument." I highlight some of the primary challenges with this argument and present additional criticisms. Finally, through a brief examination of panprotopsychism, I consider what lies ahead if Chalmers's arguments are conceded. I conclude that the phenomenal concept strategy is a sound explanation for why the conceivability of zombies likely does not imply their metaphysical possibility. Šiame straipsnyje pateikiu naują prieštaravimą Chalmerso kertiniam argumentui prieš „B tipo" fizikalistų privilegijuotą strategiją pagrindžiant aiškinimo spragą („fenomenalių sąvokų strategija"). Aš konkrečiai teigiu, kad antrasis kertinio argumento dėmuo neteisingai interpretuoja, kodėl zombiai negali patekti į mūsų episteminę situaciją sąmonės atžvilgiu. Zombiams negali būti būdingos tokios mentalinės būklės, kurias turime mes. Jeigu visi mūsų psichologiniai atributai yra būtina mūsų episteminės situacijos sąlyga, tai zombiai negali pasitarnauti kaip antrasis dilemos dėmuo. Kalbėdamas apie kontekstą, aš visų pirma trumpai aptariu susijusį argumentą, nukreiptą prieš fizikalizmą, kurį taip pat naudojo D. Chalmersas - „suvokiamumo argumentą". Aš akcentuoju kai kuriuos svarbiausius iššūkius šiam argumentui, kartu pateikdamas ir papildomų kritikos elementų. Galiausiai, glaustai panagrinėjęs panprotopsichizmą, aš svarstau, kas mūsų lauktų, jei priimtume Chalmerso argumentus. Prieinu išvadą, kad fenomenaliųjų konceptų strategija yra patikimas paaiškinimas, kodėl zombių suvokiamumas veikiausiai nereiškia jų metafizinės galimybės. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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