The Enigma of Interpersonal Justice in Private Law Theory.
The purpose of this article is to establish that contemporary private law theory has located no foolproof conception of interpersonal justice. I examine four accounts and find them wanting: the instrumentalist deterrence and loss-spreading approaches of economists; Kantian right and corrective justi...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 43; no. 4; pp. 699 - 725 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Oxford University Press / USA
Winter2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174108382&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 174108382 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01436503 BJ4 jtl: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies issn: 01436503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Winter2023 vid: 43 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 174108382 10.1093/ojls/gqad015 ppf: 699 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 211KB tig: atl: The Enigma of Interpersonal Justice in Private Law Theory. aug: au: Tan, Zhong Xing su: Civil law Corrective justice Social justice Jurisprudence Contractarianism (Ethics) sug: subj: Civil law Corrective justice Social justice Jurisprudence Contractarianism (Ethics) keyword: Interpersonal justice legal theory private law ab: The purpose of this article is to establish that contemporary private law theory has located no foolproof conception of interpersonal justice. I examine four accounts and find them wanting: the instrumentalist deterrence and loss-spreading approaches of economists; Kantian right and corrective justice; critical and social justice accounts; and the human flourishing approach. If my critiques are justified, this leaves us with the enigma of 'interpersonal justice'. I consider three options going forward, rejecting the suggestion that we should abandon the search for a theoretical concept or be content with a modus vivendi. I sketch a third option, 'emancipating interpersonal justice', drawing from the resources of contractualist philosophy, to suggest that interpersonal justice is not a unitary concept or single regulative idea but a framework for determining what we owe each other in different spheres of interaction, and propose how this might illume certain questions of private law theory. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Oxford University Press. item: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|