Government Ownership of IMF Conditionality Programs: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Validation.
The shifting emphasis on performance evaluation and accountability in the context of financial lending or foreign-aid arrangements sponsored by international organizations (IOs) has brought to the fore the question of government ownership of reforms. While the concept of ownership has featured highl...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 67; no. 4; pp. 1 - 15 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=174198886&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 174198886 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 67 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 174198886 10.1093/isq/sqad074 ppf: 1 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 174198886 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 174198886 tig: atl: Government Ownership of IMF Conditionality Programs: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Validation. aug: au: Konstantinidis, Nikitas Reinsberg, Bernhard affil: IE University , Spain University of Glasgow , UK su: International Monetary Fund Government ownership Government programs Administrative reform Financial accountability Test validity sug: subj: Government ownership Government programs International Monetary Fund International and other extra-territorial public administration International Affairs Administrative reform Financial accountability Test validity ab: The shifting emphasis on performance evaluation and accountability in the context of financial lending or foreign-aid arrangements sponsored by international organizations (IOs) has brought to the fore the question of government ownership of reforms. While the concept of ownership has featured highly in academic and policy debates over the effects of IO conditionality, it arguably remains theoretically elusive, ill-identified, and under-specified. In this article, we focus on International Monetary Fund (IMF) programs and define government ownership with respect to the counterfactual level of de jure structural reforms that would be achieved in the absence of IMF conditionality. We then use the synthetic control method to identify continuous levels of ownership as a function of a treatment effect on treated compliers and operationalize the concept of ownership over external- and financial-sector conditionality across a restricted sample of uninterrupted IMF arrangements (1980–2014). Furthermore, we probe the criterion and construct validity of our measure with respect to known determinants, proxies, and outcomes of ownership. We argue that ours is a reliable, replicable, valid, robust, and systematic measure of ownership that can help better identify and estimate the indirect relationship between program design and policy implementation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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