Fair-Weather Abusers? Civil War Dynamics and the Onset of State-Sponsored Violence.
Despite decades of rigorous research on the use of government-sponsored violence in armed conflicts, there remains significant uncertainty as to when and where leaders choose to target civilians in war. We argue that the variation in the use of state repression is explained in part by how soldiers p...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 67; no. 4; pp. 1 - 14 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=174198889&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 174198889 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 67 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 174198889 10.1093/isq/sqad077 ppf: 1 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T db: hlh ui: 174198889 – @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 174198889 tig: atl: Fair-Weather Abusers? Civil War Dynamics and the Onset of State-Sponsored Violence. aug: au: Keels, Eric Greig, J Michael affil: Air War College , USA University of North Texas , USA su: State-sponsored terrorism Civil war War Political persecution Military personnel Civilians in war sug: subj: State-sponsored terrorism Civil war War Political persecution Military personnel Civilians in war ab: Despite decades of rigorous research on the use of government-sponsored violence in armed conflicts, there remains significant uncertainty as to when and where leaders choose to target civilians in war. We argue that the variation in the use of state repression is explained in part by how soldiers perceive battlefield gains by rebel forces. Specifically, while strong opposition forces are often a necessary condition for elites convincing agents to engage in state-sponsored brutality, this is modified by the soldiers' beliefs surrounding the outcome of the war. If government soldiers believe that rebels are likely to win the war, we posit that they will likely shirk orders to target civilians, fearing post-war accountability. We test this argument by examining subnational variation in battlefield dynamics and the use of government one-sided violence from 1992 to 2010. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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