Against "Possibilist" Interpretations of Climate Models.

Climate scientists frequently employ heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? Some philosophers have advanced a possibilist interpretation: climate models stand in for possible scenarios that could occur but do not provide information about how probable those scenarios are....

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Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 1417 - 1427
Autor principal: Dethier, Corey
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2023
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Against "Possibilist" Interpretations of Climate Models.
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        au: Dethier, Corey
        affil: Leibniz Universität Hannover, Philosophy, DE, Germany
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        Atmospheric models
        Philosophers
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          Atmospheric models
          Philosophers
      ab: Climate scientists frequently employ heavily idealized models. How should these models be interpreted? Some philosophers have advanced a possibilist interpretation: climate models stand in for possible scenarios that could occur but do not provide information about how probable those scenarios are. This article argues that possibilism is (1) undermotivated, (2) incompatible with successful practices in the science, and (3) unable to correct for known biases. The upshot is that the models should be interpreted probabilistically in at least some cases.
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