On the (In?)Stability of Spacetime Inextendibility.

Leibnizian metaphysics underpins the universally held view that spacetime must be inextendible—that it must be "as large as it can be" in a sense. But here we demonstrate a surprising fact within the context of general relativity: the property of inextendibility turns out to be unstable when attenti...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 1331 - 1342
Autor principal: Manchak, JB
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Cambridge University Press Dec2023
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
Descripción
Sumario:Leibnizian metaphysics underpins the universally held view that spacetime must be inextendible—that it must be "as large as it can be" in a sense. But here we demonstrate a surprising fact within the context of general relativity: the property of inextendibility turns out to be unstable when attention is restricted to certain collections of "physically reasonable" spacetimes.