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That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance.

Like Lewis, many philosophers hold reductionist accounts of chance (on which claims about chance are to be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated) and maintain that rationality requires that credence should defer to chance (in the sense that under certain circumstances...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 1130 - 1140
Main Author: Belot, Gordon
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Dec2023
Subjects:
Philosophers
Hope
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: That Does Not Compute: David Lewis on Credence and Chance.
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      ab: Like Lewis, many philosophers hold reductionist accounts of chance (on which claims about chance are to be understood as claims that certain patterns of events are instantiated) and maintain that rationality requires that credence should defer to chance (in the sense that under certain circumstances one's credence in an event must coincide with the chance of that event). It is a shortcoming of an account of chance if it implies that this norm of rationality is unsatisfiable by computable agents. This shortcoming is more common than one might have hoped.
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