Can Bayesian Models of Cognition Show That We Are (Epistemically) Rational?

"According to [Bayesian] models" in cognitive neuroscience, says a recent textbook, "the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist." Do they? That is, do such models show we are rational? I argue that Bayesian models of cognition, perhaps surprisingly, don't and indeed can't show that we are...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 5; pp. 1069 - 1079
Main Author: Levy, Arnon
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Dec2023
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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      ab: "According to [Bayesian] models" in cognitive neuroscience, says a recent textbook, "the human mind behaves like a capable data scientist." Do they? That is, do such models show we are rational? I argue that Bayesian models of cognition, perhaps surprisingly, don't and indeed can't show that we are Bayes-rational. The key reason is that they appeal to approximations, a fact that carries significant implications. After outlining the argument, I critique two responses, seen in recent cognitive neuroscience. One says that the mind can be seen as approximately Bayes-rational, while the other reconceives norms of rationality.
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