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Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution.

Neural structural representations are cerebral map- or model-like structures that structurally resemble what they represent. These representations are absolutely central to the “cognitive neuroscience revolution”, as they are the only type of representation compatible with the revolutionaries’ mecha...

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Published in:Synthese Vol. 203; no. 1; pp. 1 - 43
Main Author: Facchin, Marco
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jan2024
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Neural representations unobserved—or: a dilemma for the cognitive neuroscience revolution.
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        au: Facchin, Marco
        affil: https://ror.org/008x57b05 Centre for Philosophical Psychology, Antwerp University, Prinstraat 13, 2000, Antwerp, Belgium
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        Eliminativism
        Mechanistic explanation
        Neurocognitive revolution
        Neuroscience
        Structural representations
      ab: Neural structural representations are cerebral map- or model-like structures that structurally resemble what they represent. These representations are absolutely central to the “cognitive neuroscience revolution”, as they are the only type of representation compatible with the revolutionaries’ mechanistic commitments. Crucially, however, these very same commitments entail that structural representations can be observed in the swirl of neuronal activity. Here, I argue that no structural representations have been observed being present in our neuronal activity, no matter the spatiotemporal scale of observation. My argument begins by introducing the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” (Sect. 1) and sketching a prominent, widely adopted account of structural representations (Sect. 2). Then, I will consult various reports that describe our neuronal activity at various spatiotemporal scales, arguing that none of them reports the presence of structural representations (Sect. 3). After having deflected certain intuitive objections to my analysis (Sect. 4), I will conclude that, in the absence of neural structural representations, representationalism and mechanism can’t go together, and so the “cognitive neuroscience revolution” is forced to abandon one of its commitments (Sect. 5).
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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