Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence.

Perceptual Confidence is the view that our conscious perceptual experiences assign confidence. In previous papers, I motivated it using first‐personal evidence (Morrison, 2016), and Jessie Munton motivated it using normative evidence (Munton, 2016). In this paper, I will consider the extent to which...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 108; no. 1; pp. 106 - 136
Autor principal: Morrison, John
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2024
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174818152&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 174818152
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        00318205
        PPO
      jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
      issn: 00318205
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jan2024
      vid: 108
      iid: 1
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        174818152
        10.1111/phpr.12951
      ppf: 106
      ppct: 30
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: C
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 855KB
      tig:
        atl: Third‐personal evidence for perceptual confidence.
      aug:
        au: Morrison, John
        affil: Barnard College, Columbia University
      su:
        Evidence
        Confidence
        Proposition (Logic)
        Priming (Psychology)
        Consciousness
      sug:
        subj:
          Evidence
          Confidence
          Proposition (Logic)
          Priming (Psychology)
          Consciousness
      ab: Perceptual Confidence is the view that our conscious perceptual experiences assign confidence. In previous papers, I motivated it using first‐personal evidence (Morrison, 2016), and Jessie Munton motivated it using normative evidence (Munton, 2016). In this paper, I will consider the extent to which it is motivated by third‐personal evidence. I will argue that the current evidence is supportive but not decisive. I will then describe experiments that might provide stronger evidence. I hope to thereby provide a roadmap for future research.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.
      item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
      holder: Wiley-Blackwell
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2024
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N