Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation.
A foundationalist account of our empirical thinking divides propositions we accept into two classes, basic and derivative, and sees the warrant of derivative propositions as accruing to them through their derivation from basic propositions. Such an account needs to answer two questions: which propos...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 108; no. 1; pp. 177 - 203 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174818156&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 174818156 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2024 vid: 108 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 174818156 10.1111/phpr.12955 ppf: 177 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 486KB tig: atl: Foundationalism and empirical reason: On the rational significance of observation. aug: au: Gupta, Anil affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, USA su: Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge) Empirical research Proposition (Logic) Perception (Philosophy) Sellars, Wilfrid, 1912-1989 sug: subj: Foundationalism (Theory of knowledge) Empirical research Proposition (Logic) Perception (Philosophy) Sellars, Wilfrid, 1912-1989 ab: A foundationalist account of our empirical thinking divides propositions we accept into two classes, basic and derivative, and sees the warrant of derivative propositions as accruing to them through their derivation from basic propositions. Such an account needs to answer two questions: which propositions are basic, and whence do basic propositions acquire their warrant? A natural and ancient answer to these questions is that basic propositions are observational and that these propositions gain their warrant from perceptions. I critically examine this view and also a variant view offered by Wilfrid Sellars. I put forward an alternative conception, dialectical foundationalism, that sees the distinction between the basic and the derivative as issuing from a distinction between two kinds of reasoning, derivational and dialectical. This type of foundationalism provides a more accurate account of our empirical thinking, I argue, than its traditional and Sellarsian counterparts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|