On the criteria of the imitation for the artificial intelligent systems in the moral imitation game.
To assess the intelligence of machines, Alan Turing proposed a test of imitation known as the imitation game, famously known as the Turing test. To assess whether artificial intelligent (AI) systems could be moral or not, Colin Allen et al. developed a test of imitation in the context of morality, a...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 89; no. 6; pp. 872 - 891 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Dec2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174912778&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 174912778 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Dec2023 vid: 89 iid: 6 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 174912778 10.1111/theo.12502 ppf: 872 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 210KB tig: atl: On the criteria of the imitation for the artificial intelligent systems in the moral imitation game. aug: au: Thomas, Jolly affil: Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology, Dharwad, India su: Artificial intelligence Moral agent (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Philosophical analysis Interrogatories sug: subj: Artificial intelligence Moral agent (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Philosophical analysis Interrogatories keyword: AI and ethics artificial moral agent ethics of technology moral imitation Moral Turing Test ab: To assess the intelligence of machines, Alan Turing proposed a test of imitation known as the imitation game, famously known as the Turing test. To assess whether artificial intelligent (AI) systems could be moral or not, Colin Allen et al. developed a test of imitation in the context of morality, a test known as the Moral Turing Test (MTT), which I will, in this paper, call the moral imitation game. There are arguments against developing any type of MTT or moral imitation game. Rather than developing a moral imitation game, this paper proposes a criterion of imitation for AI systems in the moral scenario. To develop a criterion of imitation, I explore the notion of moral attribution in detail. Within the case of moral attribution, I introduce the subject‐ascriber distinction. The notion of moral attribution and the subject‐ascriber distinction is employed to address the following questions: (a) how is the assessment in MTT arranged?, (b) what is the role of the interrogator in the MTT?, and (c) what information is to be concealed from the interrogator? The first question deals with the aspect of assessment, the second question deals with the reordering of the role of the interrogator and the third one deals with the concealment aspect of the imitation game. After that, a criterion of imitation for AI systems is put forward. Using the subject‐ascriber distinction in moral attribution and David Lewis' Mad Pain and Martian Pain cases, it is argued that the notion of sentience is insignificant for the ascriber for moral attributions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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