Argumentation-induced rational issue polarisation.
Computational models have shown how polarisation can rise among deliberating agents as they approximate epistemic rationality. This paper provides further support for the thesis that polarisation can rise under condition of epistemic rationality, but it does not depend on limitations that extant mod...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 1; pp. 83 - 108 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jan2024
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=174953008&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 174953008 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2024 vid: 181 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 174953008 10.1007/s11098-023-02059-6 ppf: 83 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2MB tig: atl: Argumentation-induced rational issue polarisation. aug: au: Kopecky, Felix affil: https://ror.org/04t3en479 Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, DebateLab, Karlsruhe, Germany su: Epistemics Social epistemology Polarization (Social sciences) Debate Deliberation Multiagent systems Reason sug: subj: Epistemics Social epistemology Polarization (Social sciences) Debate Deliberation Multiagent systems Reason keyword: Agent-based models (ABM) Argumentation Epistemic rationality Opinion dynamics Polarisation ab: Computational models have shown how polarisation can rise among deliberating agents as they approximate epistemic rationality. This paper provides further support for the thesis that polarisation can rise under condition of epistemic rationality, but it does not depend on limitations that extant models rely on, such as memory restrictions or biased evaluation of other agents' testimony. Instead, deliberation is modelled through agents' purposeful introduction of arguments and their rational reactions to introductions of others. This process induces polarisation dynamics on its own. A second result is that the effect size of polarisation dynamics correlates with particular types of argumentative behaviour. Polarisation effects can be soothed when agents take into account the opinions of others as premises, and they are amplified as agents fortify their own beliefs. These results underpin the relevance of argumentation as a factor in social-epistemic processes and indicate that rising issue polarisation is not a reliable indicator of epistemic shortcomings. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|