Remembering requires no reliability.

I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer'...

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Published in:Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 1; pp. 43 - 64
Main Author: Lai, Changsheng
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Jan2024
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11098-023-02073-8
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        atl: Remembering requires no reliability.
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        au: Lai, Changsheng
        affil: https://ror.org/0220qvk04 Department of Philosophy, School of Humanities, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, No. 800, Dongchuan Road, Minhang District, Shanghai, China
      su:
        Episodic memory
        Reliabilism (Theory of knowledge)
        Neo-geo (Art)
        Alzheimer's disease
        Memory disorders
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          Episodic memory
          Reliabilism (Theory of knowledge)
          Neo-geo (Art)
          Alzheimer's disease
          Memory disorders
      keyword:
        Alzheimer's Disease
        Reliabilism
        Simulationism
        The generality problem
      ab: I argue against mnemic reliabilism, an influential view that successful remembering must be produced by a reliable memory process. Drawing on empirical evidence from psychology and neuroscience, I refute mnemic reliabilism by demonstrating that: (1) patients with memory impairments (e.g., Alzheimer's disease) can also successfully remember the past despite the unreliability of their corresponding memory processes; (2) some reliability-affecting factors (e.g., stress, divided attention, and insufficient encoding time) can render the memory processes of healthy individuals unreliable without preventing them from occasionally resulting in successful remembering. Potential responses available for mnemic reliabilism are also evaluated. I show that those responses are susceptible to a challenge akin to the generality problem for process reliabilism.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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