Why bother with so what?
I address a family of objections I label the So What? objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the moral properties in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we ex...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 1; pp. 349 - 368 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I address a family of objections I label the So What? objection to robust non-naturalist realism (or, just non-naturalism). This objection concludes that non-naturalism fails to identify the moral properties in virtue of failing to explain why non-natural properties would have all the features we expect moral properties to have and can be extended to provide the conclusion that the non-naturalist is therefore immoral. I argue that So What? is question-begging because it disallows non-naturalists their central theoretical claim: there are ethical properties iff they are fundamental properties (and, in virtue of that, non-natural). I then diagnose the error anti-non-naturalists make explicitly: those who object to non-naturalism along the lines of So What? either fail to understand precisely what the theory claims or fail to understand non-naturalist motivations for going in for that theory. |
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