Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.
The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 89; no. 1; pp. 1 - 25 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jan2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=175138556&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 175138556 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2024 vid: 89 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 175138556 10.1007/s10670-021-00430-9 ppf: 1 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 655KB tig: atl: Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence. aug: au: Schmidt, Sebastian affil: https://ror.org/02crff812 Philosophisches Seminar, University of Zurich (UZH), Room G-228, Zürichbergstrasse 43, 8044, Zurich, Switzerland su: Normativity (Ethics) Trust Responsibility Instrumentalism (Philosophy) Pragmatism Orthography & spelling Practical reason sug: subj: Normativity (Ethics) Trust Responsibility Instrumentalism (Philosophy) Pragmatism Orthography & spelling Practical reason ab: The normative force of evidence can seem puzzling. It seems that having conclusive evidence for a proposition does not, by itself, make it true that one ought to believe the proposition. But spelling out the condition that evidence must meet in order to provide us with genuine normative reasons for belief seems to lead us into a dilemma: the condition either fails to explain the normative significance of epistemic reasons or it renders the content of epistemic norms practical. The first aim of this paper is to spell out this challenge for the normativity of evidence. I argue that the challenge rests on a plausible assumption about the conceptual connection between normative reasons and blameworthiness. The second aim of the paper is to show how we can meet the challenge by spelling out a concept of epistemic blameworthiness. Drawing on recent accounts of doxastic responsibility and epistemic blame, I suggest that the normativity of evidence is revealed in our practice of suspending epistemic trust in response to impaired epistemic relationships. Recognizing suspension of trust as a form of epistemic blame allows us to make sense of a purely epistemic kind of normativity the existence of which has recently been called into doubt by certain versions of pragmatism and instrumentalism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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