Only CDT values knowledge.
Causal decision theory is often motivated as a 'revision of [decision theory] intended to solve Newcomb's problem' (Bacon 2022). In this paper, I give a direct argument for CDT by deriving it from a venerable decision-theoretic principle: the value of knowledge principle. The general framework that...
| Publicado en: | Analysis Vol. 84; no. 1; pp. 67 - 83 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Causal decision theory is often motivated as a 'revision of [decision theory] intended to solve Newcomb's problem' (Bacon 2022). In this paper, I give a direct argument for CDT by deriving it from a venerable decision-theoretic principle: the value of knowledge principle. The general framework that I use to deliver this result also supports a new argument for conditionalization. |
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