The simulation argument reconsidered.
Some philosophers regard it as a serious possibility that we now exist within a simulation. That this hypothesis is somewhat probable has been defended extensively by Nick Bostrom. Notably, Bostrom does not defend the conclusion that we inhabit a simulation, but rather the disjunctive conclusion tha...
| Publicado en: | Analysis Vol. 84; no. 1; pp. 23 - 32 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=175416592&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 175416592 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00032638 7OX jtl: Analysis issn: 00032638 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2024 vid: 84 iid: 1 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 175416592 10.1093/analys/anad048 ppf: 23 ppct: 9 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 114KB tig: atl: The simulation argument reconsidered. aug: au: Harris, Keith Raymond affil: Ruhr-Universität Bochum , Germany su: Iterative methods (Mathematics) Numerical analysis Iterative decoding Conjugate gradient methods Generalized minimal residual method sug: subj: Iterative methods (Mathematics) Numerical analysis Iterative decoding Conjugate gradient methods Generalized minimal residual method keyword: existential risk simulation argument skepticism virtual reality ab: Some philosophers regard it as a serious possibility that we now exist within a simulation. That this hypothesis is somewhat probable has been defended extensively by Nick Bostrom. Notably, Bostrom does not defend the conclusion that we inhabit a simulation, but rather the disjunctive conclusion that the human species is very likely to die out before reaching a 'posthuman stage', that posthuman civilizations are extremely unlikely to run significant numbers of simulations, or that we almost certainly inhabit a simulation. Bostrom argues that there is no basis for strongly favouring one of these alternatives over its counterparts. The upshot is that it is fairly probable that we inhabit a simulation. I argue that posthuman civilizations are likely to be unwilling to run significant numbers of simulations, thereby undermining the case for assigning a somewhat high probability to the hypothesis that we live in a simulation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 The Analysis Trust. item: Analysis holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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