Functionalisms and the Philosophy of Action.
Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and ins...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 41; no. 1; pp. 41 - 56 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Feb2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=175448385&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 175448385 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Feb2024 vid: 41 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 175448385 10.1111/japp.12707 ppf: 41 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 228KB tig: atl: Functionalisms and the Philosophy of Action. aug: au: Vargas, Manuel affil: University of California San Diego, La Jolla CA, , USA su: Bratman, Michael E., 1945- Act (Philosophy) Methodological individualism Action theory (Psychology) Agency theory Systemic risk (Finance) sug: subj: Bratman, Michael E., 1945- Act (Philosophy) Methodological individualism Action theory (Psychology) Agency theory Systemic risk (Finance) ab: Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti‐individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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