How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's 'Core Capacity Thesis' and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences.
Throughout his career, Michael Bratman has developed a detailed model of individual 'planning agency', and, more recently, models of joint action and aspects of social life that he argues such planning agency helps support. How might we empirically investigate whether these models capture what is go...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 41; no. 1; pp. 16 - 30 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Feb2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=175448386&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 175448386 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Feb2024 vid: 41 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 175448386 10.1111/japp.12710 ppf: 16 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 197KB tig: atl: How Does Human Agency Actually Work? On Bratman's 'Core Capacity Thesis' and the Relation between Philosophy of Action and the Empirical Sciences. aug: au: Phillips, Jonathan Plunkett, David affil: Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, , USA su: Bratman, Michael E., 1945- Act (Philosophy) Social action Capacity requirements planning Cognitive science Psychology Vocational guidance sug: subj: Bratman, Michael E., 1945- Act (Philosophy) Social action Capacity requirements planning Cognitive science Psychology Vocational guidance ab: Throughout his career, Michael Bratman has developed a detailed model of individual 'planning agency', and, more recently, models of joint action and aspects of social life that he argues such planning agency helps support. How might we empirically investigate whether these models capture what is going on in actual human lives? In this article, we critically engage with this broad question by focusing on what Bratman calls the 'core capacity thesis', which is at the center of his most recent discussions of how his work in the philosophy of action hangs together. In his own words, the core capacity thesis claims that 'our capacity for planning agency plays basic roles in multiple, interrelated systems of human, mind‐shaped practical organization, individual and social'. We explore how one might go about testing this thesis, focusing on Bratman's particular way of defending this thesis using the idea of 'nested Cummins functions'. In so doing, we hope to contribute to a broader discussion about what the relationship is (or, perhaps more importantly, should be) between the kind of philosophy of action Bratman does and empirical work in fields such as psychology, cognitive science, and biology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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