Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett's Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value.
This article explores the topic of epistemic value and the ongoing debate between realism and anti-realism. The author defends a version of realism by addressing Hazlett's challenge, which raises questions about the source, uniqueness, and scope of epistemic evaluation. The article also discusses th...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Value Inquiry Vol. 58; no. 1; pp. 73 - 92 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=175543485&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 175543485 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00225363 OJ8 jtl: Journal of Value Inquiry issn: 00225363 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2024 vid: 58 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 175543485 10.1007/s10790-021-09869-z ppf: 73 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 657KB tig: atl: Realism, Naturalism, and Hazlett's Challenge Concerning Epistemic Value. aug: au: Perrine, Timothy affil: https://ror.org/033vjfk17 School of Philosophy, Wuhan University, 299 Bayi Road, Wuchang District, Wuhan, Hubei, China su: Realism Moral realism Naturalism Philosophy of science Philosophy of mind Moral relativism Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Realism Moral realism Naturalism Philosophy of science Philosophy of mind Moral relativism Theory of knowledge ab: This article explores the topic of epistemic value and the ongoing debate between realism and anti-realism. The author defends a version of realism by addressing Hazlett's challenge, which raises questions about the source, uniqueness, and scope of epistemic evaluation. The article also discusses the concept of fundamental principles of epistemic value and their relationship to non-fundamental principles. It argues that proponents of Non-Nihilism, whether realists or anti-realists, are committed to the existence of fundamental principles of epistemic value. Additionally, the article addresses Hazlett's challenge regarding the Truth Principle and concludes by discussing whether epistemic value is a reducible or irreducible property. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Value Inquiry is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Value Inquiry holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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