In defence of object-given reasons.
One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive bala...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 181; no. 2/3; pp. 485 - 512 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Mar2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=175695405&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 175695405 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2024 vid: 181 iid: 2/3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 175695405 10.1007/s11098-024-02109-7 ppf: 485 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: In defence of object-given reasons. aug: au: Vollmer, Michael affil: https://ror.org/038t36y30 University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany su: Epistemics Pragmatics Normativity (Ethics) Monetary incentives Reason sug: subj: Epistemics Pragmatics Normativity (Ethics) Monetary incentives Reason keyword: Decidedness Epistemic Normativity Object-given reasons Right kind of reasons Suspending intentions Suspension of judgement ab: One recurrent objection to the idea that the right kind of reasons for or against an attitude are object-given reasons for or against that attitude is that object-given reasons for or against belief and disbelief are incapable of explaining certain features of epistemic normativity. Prohibitive balancing, the behaviour of bare statistical evidence, information about future or easily available evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, as well as higher-order defeaters, are all said to be inexplicable in terms of those object-given reasons. In this paper, I provide a rebuttal to all these challenges by drawing attention to the object-given reasons for and against the third doxastic state, namely the suspension of judgement. First, I introduce an original picture of how suspension relates to belief and disbelief – as ways of being decided – which yields a novel weighing model of the corresponding reasons. Second, I demonstrate that this new take on doxastic deliberation can accommodate all five features of epistemic normativity. Finally, I extend the weighing model to cover practical deliberation and the suspension of intentions. The resulting theory provides an explanation of why epistemic and practical normativity differ in certain respects in terms of a significant difference between doxastic and conative suspension. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2024. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2024 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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