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Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory.

The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not...

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Published in:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 105; no. 1; pp. 115 - 157
Main Author: Gallow, J. Dmitri
Format: Article
Published: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2024
Subjects:
Counterfactuals (Logic)
Decision theory
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Counterfactual Decision Theory Is Causal Decision Theory.
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        au: Gallow, J. Dmitri
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        Counterfactuals (Logic)
        Decision theory
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          Counterfactuals (Logic)
          Decision theory
      ab: The role of causation and counterfactuals in causal decision theory is vexed and disputed. Recently, Brian Hedden (2023) argues that we should abandon causal decision theory in favour of an alternative: counterfactual decision theory. I argue that, pace Hedden, counterfactual decision theory is not a competitor to, but rather a version of, causal decision theory – the most popular version by far. I provide textual evidence that the founding fathers of causal decision theory (Stalnaker, Gibbard, Harper, Lewis, Skyrms, Sobel, and Joyce) all endorse counterfactual decision theories. I additionally discuss why these theories came to be called 'causal', rather than 'counterfactual'. And I argue that, properly understood, causal decision theory escapes Hedden's objections.
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    language: English
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          year: 2024
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