Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy.
Using a dynamic preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we show that political biases in exporting and import‐competing sectors substantially impact the extent of PTA formation. While both exclusion and free riding incentives constrain the expansion to global free trade in a free trade a...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 62; no. 2; pp. 748 - 782 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2024
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=176012096&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 176012096 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2024 vid: 62 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 176012096 10.1111/ecin.13199 ppf: 748 ppct: 34 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.2MB tig: atl: Dynamic preferential trade agreement formation and the role of political economy. aug: au: Chi, Eric Conglin Yildiz, Halis Murat affil: Department of Economics and Finance, University of Guelph, Guelph Ontario,, Canada Department of Economics, Toronto Metropolitan University, Toronto Ontario,, Canada su: International trade Free trade Customs unions sug: subj: International trade International Trade Financing Free trade Customs unions keyword: customs union free trade agreement Markov perfect equilibrium political economy preferential trade agreement customs union free trade agreement Markov perfect equilibrium political economy preferential trade agreement ab: Using a dynamic preferential trade agreement (PTA) formation model, we show that political biases in exporting and import‐competing sectors substantially impact the extent of PTA formation. While both exclusion and free riding incentives constrain the expansion to global free trade in a free trade agreement (FTA) game, only the former incentive arises in a customs union (CU) game. When we endogenize the choice between FTAs and CUs, the tension between the flexibility benefit of FTAs and the coordination benefit of CUs reveals that FTAs always serve as PTA building blocks while CUs may serve as PTA building or stumbling blocks. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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