The Hole Argument without the notion of isomorphism.

In this paper, I argue that the Hole Argument can be formulated without using the notion of isomorphism, and for this reason it is not threatened by the criticism of Halvorson and Manchak (Br J Philos Sci, 2022. ). Following Earman and Norton (Br J Philos Sci 38, pp. 515–525, 1987), I divide the Hol...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 203; no. 3; pp. 1 - 29
Autor principal: Luc, Joanna
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2024
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: The Hole Argument without the notion of isomorphism.
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        au: Luc, Joanna
        affil: https://ror.org/03bqmcz70 Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Grodzka 52, 31-044, Kraków, Poland
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      keyword:
        Form-invariance
        Hole Argument
        Isomorphism
        Symmetry
      ab: In this paper, I argue that the Hole Argument can be formulated without using the notion of isomorphism, and for this reason it is not threatened by the criticism of Halvorson and Manchak (Br J Philos Sci, 2022. ). Following Earman and Norton (Br J Philos Sci 38, pp. 515–525, 1987), I divide the Hole Argument into two steps: the proof of the Gauge Theorem and the transition from the Gauge Theorem to the conclusion of radical indeterminism. In the analaysis of the first step, I argue that the Gauge Theorem does not rely on the notion of isomorphism but on the notion of the diffeomorphism-invariance of the equations of local spacetime theories; however, for this approach to work, the definition of local spacetime theories needs certain amendments with respect to Earman and Norton’s formulation. In the analysis of the second step, I postulate that we should use the notion of radical indeterminism instead of indeterminism simpliciter and that we should not decide in advance what kind of maps are to be used in comparing models. Instead, we can tentatively choose some kind of maps for this purpose and check whether a given choice leads to radical indeterminism involving empirically indistinguishable models. In this way, the use of the notion of isomorphism is also avoided in the second step of the Hole Argument. A general picture is that physical equivalence can be established by means of an iterative procedure in which we examine various candidate classes of maps, and, depending on the outcomes, we need to broaden or narrow these classes. The Hole Argument can be viewed as a particular instance of this procedure.
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